IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH

EASTGLEN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Washington nonprofit corporation; and SAVEBOTHELL, a Washington nonprofit corporation,))))		
Petitioners,)		
vs.)	Cause:	24-2-03111-31
SNOHOMISH COUNTY; NP SNOHOMISH COUNTY 228th APARTMENTS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability Company,)))		
Respondents.)		

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Heard before the Honorable MILLIE M. JUDGE at the Snohomish County Courthouse, 3000 Rockefeller Avenue, Department 2G, Everett, Washington 98201

DATE: July 5th, 2024

REPORTED BY: Megan R. Foote, CCR #3398, CRR, RPR Snohomish County Superior Court 3000 Rockefeller Avenue, M/S 502 Everett, Washington 98201

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BY: DUANA T. KOLOUŠKOVÁ (Via Zoom)

All right. So we're here for --

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MR. ARAMBURU: Oh, good morning, Your Honor. This is Rick Aramburu here representing SaveBothell, one of

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the petitioners in this matter.

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THE COURT: My apologies, Mr. Aramburu. Thank

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you.

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Okay. So we're here this morning on the initial

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hearing. There are, as far as I understand, two

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issues that have been raised: One is standing, and

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the other is whether the Court has jurisdiction and/or $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left(1\right) +\left(1\right) \left(1\right) \left($

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whether, as a remedy, a stay should be issued.

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We'll start with Ms. Conway. Do you wish to make

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any oral argument today?

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MS. CONWAY: So, Your Honor, I suggest we break up

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the issues one by one, and I'll just address the

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standing issue. The project that's being proposed by

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NP and is currently under review --

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THE REPORTER: I need you to slow down a bit.

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THE COURT: I'm sorry. The court reporter needs

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you to slow down a little bit.

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MS. CONWAY: Oh, I apologize. I'll just start

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from the beginning.

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is a relatively small development that is directly

I represent Eastglen Homeowners Association, which

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adjacent to the development that is being proposed by

respondent NP. What's significant about the Eastglen development is that they have wetlands of which they are responsible to monitor and maintain and keep in their current state, if you will. And this project, which is directly adjacent to it, is going to have effects on these wetlands.

I don't have a whole lot more to add to what I put in the briefing, but, clearly -- I mean, they certainly have standing to protect their wetlands.

And I suppose one of the ironies here is, if they did not and there's some issues with the wetlands moving forward because of this project, the County could then turn around and sue them for not maintaining their wetlands properly. So I think it's a no-brainer that the Homeowners Association has standing to bring this LUPA petition, given that it owns those wetlands and is responsible for them.

Also under the law, as I mentioned, RCW 64.38 -- I forget the subdivision, but they -- the legislature has found that an organization -- a homeowners association can bring actions on its behalf, or on behalf of its members. Mr. Aramburu may want to speak to SaveBothell, or I can say a few words about that; I did do the briefing on the motion.

THE COURT: Sure. Let's let Mr. Aramburu speak

for his client.

MR. ARAMBURU: Just briefly, Your Honor, the issue is well covered in the briefing, particularly, the reply brief and opening brief by Ms. Conway.

SaveBothell is an organization recently formed to address concerns in the community, particularly regarding this project. We have identified members in the community that live nearby this very large project, which is 26 acres. And, in particular,

Ms. Thomas, Joan Thomas, who is the founder of SaveBothell, lives within 4- or 500 feet of the development, and her property is also adjacent to the wetlands.

So we believe that under the broad authorization of standing in the state, including the Save v.

Bothell decision, SaveBothell has standing, along with Eastglen. And that's all I have to supplement what's been said. If you have some questions, Your Honor, let me know.

THE COURT: Thank you. I don't at this time.

Let's hear from Ms. Koloušková next.

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Thank you, Your Honor. And I will let you know that I am working out of a friend's house this morning. So apologies for using a very small-screen laptop and flipping back and forth

between notes and Your Honor.

That being said, I -- I certainly agree that the issues, when it comes to standing, are well briefed, and we believe that the answers regarding standing are probably pretty well established here. No one is debating the standards related to standing.

For an association to have standing, it must show evidence that a member of the organization has standing to sue in their own right. And they still have to show also injury in fact. Certainly, the situation is different for Eastglen versus SaveBothell. When it comes to Eastglen, we're perfectly well aware that they have ownership over the wetlands; they're adjacent. Our concern over that issue is that Eastglen has not actually alleged any injury in fact; they have simply alleged that they want, essentially, proper enforcement of the home — of the manual, and that they have a homeowners duty. That's not quite the standard.

Certainly, we recognize that adjacent property owners to -- or property owners who might own a piece of property where there is a relatively clear link have a certain position that's different from an association, such as SaveBothell, but it is not appropriate for the Court to simply assume standing in

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these types of circumstances. And petitioners have really not made a showing; they have only argued that they want proper interpretation of the manual, and we believe that's insufficient.

When it comes to SaveBothell, Your Honor, we would posit that there really is no meaningful standing of allegation on their behalf. They presented two declarations to the Court, which say basically nothing different than what was already in the petition. Mr. Lider's declaration does not allege any basis for standing at all. And Ms. Thomas's declaration alleges that she lives in an undescribed location adjacent to some open space owned by Eastglen, without any detail. Because SaveBothell chose not to actually substantiate her location or any actual injury in fact, NorthPoint did its own research based on Ms. Thomas being the registered agent for SaveBothell -- and attached to Mr. Villwock's declarations -- show that Ms. Bothell's [sic] property is neither near the NorthPoint site or the wetland that petitioners are concerned about.

Now, they are certainly stating concerns that, really, any member of the public in Snohomish County near the city of Bothell could raise, and they can do that through public comment, and they have amply

availed themselves of that opportunity. But standing does require more. It does actually require some showing. And the pleadings do not show that -- do not provide that showing at all. In fact, all they do is allege almost the exact same things that the petitioners in the Nykreim case allege and that the Nykreim court soundly rejected as insufficient for purposes of standing.

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So for SaveBothell, there's no injury in fact and no membership allegation that they could apparently perpetuate on behalf of their association. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

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Ms. Kraft-Klehm?

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MS. KRAFT-KLEHM: I don't have anything to add, Your Honor. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

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We'll go back to Ms. Conway. Any response?

18 MS. CONWAY: You know, as I was listening to 19 counsel for NP, my initial thought was, "We're trying

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to prevent the injury in fact from happening." That's

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why we have standing, because if it is -- obviously,

the HOA's contention that, if the project goes forward

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under the current way it's managing the drainage,

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pursuant to the decision that's at issue in this

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appeal, there will be harm. And that does -- that is

sufficient to provide standing under the law.

And, again, they are required -- you know, I'm sure they would prefer not to -- but they are required to maintain and help sustain those wetlands, which are central to the issue that the -- the decision that's before the Court today.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Aramburu, your response?

MR. ARAMBURU: (Indicating.)

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. You're on mute.

MR. ARAMBURU: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. Just a couple of comments. It was indeed Snohomish County, when they approved the Eastglen plan, that required Eastglen maintaining those wetlands. And Eastglen is doing so by filing this petition to prevent stormwater in, you know, an illegal fashion and in an illegal manner, to invade their wetlands.

As to SaveBothell, SaveBothell's founder lives very close by, even according to Ms. Koloušková's analysis and research. She's adjacent to the subdivision. She's not miles away -- she's feet away from the subdivision, from the proposed apartments, and that proximity plus that of its members authorizes standing in these circumstances. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Aramburu, in response to

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Ms. Koloušková's argument regarding the Nykreim case, can you address that issue?

MR. ARAMBURU: Well, yeah, in this case, we have identified a member who is close by who will suffer damages because of the circumstances. And in addition, we have identified members of the larger group of SaveBothell that are nearby and will be impacted by not only the water running into the wetlands but the increased volumes downstream in Snohomish County streams, including Crystal Creek.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right. With regard to the standing issue, I find in favor of the petitioners. I do believe that Eastglen has demonstrated appropriate impacts and standing. They are the Homeowners Association. They have members who are directly, I guess, downstream, of the proposed development and will be impacted and are legally responsible for the maintenance of the wetland that is being analyzed in the issue of the appeal.

With respect to SaveBothell, they're a nonprofit. They have identified that the member who lives nearby, and, specifically, in close proximity, within 400 feet, of the adjacent wetland that is at issue in this case. Their organization is organized for the purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the

adjacent area, and the Court finds they have standing as well.

Let's move next to the issue of jurisdiction and the motion to dismiss and/or stay. I guess if we -- if you don't mind, we'll go in the same order as we started with.

Ms. Conway?

MS. CONWAY: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't have a whole lot to add to what I put in the briefing. But as the Court is aware, the County -- it is a little unusual in some aspects here --

THE COURT: We're having a little bit of trouble hearing you. Is there any way you could be a little closer to your mic?

MS. CONWAY: Sure. Just give me a second. Is it now better?

THE COURT: Yeah, thank you.

MS. CONWAY: Yeah. I just turned up the volume; hopefully, that will take care of it.

The -- as I was starting to say, the code -- the Snohomish County Code is somewhat unusual in how decisions of the nature that is before the Court are made. There is no review by the hearing examiner. It is flat-out not allowed, ergo, why we have this LUPA petition to take issue directly to this Court.

They make a number of arguments about why -- "Oh, we should wait until the whole project is reviewed," but even when the project review is done -- and, presumably, there will be an appeal to the hearing examiner by either parties in this case, or other parties -- the hearing examiner still cannot weigh on the decision that was made that is the subject of this appeal. Nobody can argue whether or not that makes a whole lot of sense, but that is the way that the code is set up.

And although there is certainly some factual appeal to say, "Well, why don't you just wait until we go through the hearing examiner process to get these other determinations made and then appeal everything altogether," we get that there's appeal, but this is a fundamental question, that, you know, the methodology that the County is allowing NP to use, is contrary, we say, of course, to what the code requires.

They use the wrong soil types, which they don't really ever address. I mean, it is undisputed that these are Type B soils. It is also undisputed that that when they ran the model, they used Type C as the type of soil, which raised -- which, according to our expert, produces very different results.

And then there's the whole Method 1 versus

Method 2 issue. You are required -- it says shall in the code -- to use Method 1, if you can access the wetlands. Here, they never asked for access to the wetlands. When the Homeowners Association found out about it, they offered access to the wetlands. And, yet, they claim the whole basis of the determination that's -- you know, that's -- that's before the Court was -- is based on them not having access to the wetlands.

So, again, we think it's a fundamental issue. We think it's better to get it done on the front end, particularly, given how long it's taking right now to get the actual project approvals. And I think I'll leave it at that for now and turn it over to Mr. Aramburu.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Aramburu?

MR. ARAMBURU: I think the briefing well covers the issues. The idea that we should defer these -this decision on the modification, on the correct soil type, and on the correct method until after there is a hearing before the hearing examiner on this very large project makes absolutely no sense. The outcome of the modification, the question of the soil types, the question of the method, if that turns out to be in

favor of appellants -- that is my clients and

Ms. Conway's clients -- that means the whole thing has

to be re-done, as the entire project may change

dramatically because there will be less space to put

apartment buildings that are planned here.

So the County has made it clear that in these circumstances the hearing examiner has no jurisdiction, and the -- the decisions that are made here are -- are crucial to the outcome. And, again, Your Honor, we're in a preliminary hearing. You have not heard all of the -- the evidence that would be on the record to address these issues. This is not the appropriate time to -- to dismiss these issues and put them into some sort of stay proceeding.

So I think the most important point here is the outcome of the modification, soil types, the method can completely change the project, and we will waste hours of hearing examiner time, counsel time, if this — this matter is stayed and the modification reversed.

I have nothing further, Your Honor. Thank you for the opportunity to speak. I will answer any questions.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Koloušková?

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MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Thank you, Your Honor. 1 2 Petitioners have raised, clearly, two issues, whether 3 the soil types used were correct and whether the County chose the right method, under Minimum 4 5 Requirement 8 under the manual. Those are fundamental issues related to the site plan approval itself; they 6 have nothing to do with a modification. No modification is needed for the County to administer 8 9 the manual with respect to these issues.

> This is why petitioners have failed to bring a claim that this Court can adjudicate, because the modification does not -- is not needed for the County to administer the manual itself. The modification pertains to the stormwater methodology that is used -or pardon me -- the stormwater modeling that is used after the County makes the decisions as to soil types and whether Method 1 and Method 2 are being used. modification --

THE COURT: So let me ask you a question.

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Yes.

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THE COURT: If the modification is not at issue, when would the appellants ever have an opportunity to challenge it?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: If the -- well, first off, appellants have not raised any issues related to the

modification. The issues they have raised go to the hearing examiner, if they wish to appeal the site plan approval.

If they had raised issues regarding the modification, which is purely related to how the stormwater modeling is applied to this specific site, under the Method 2 provision of the Minimum Requirement 8, if they had raised those issues, those could arguably be, ultimately, come to, I guess, a court, if they wanted to go that far after the site approval process is done because this modification has absolutely no utility in the abstract. It's not entitlement itself. It alone does not entitle the applicant to do anything. It has no utility, absent that site plan approval. And so --

THE COURT: Wouldn't your client then come back -had they not brought this appeal now and sat back and
waited, wouldn't your client come back and be in a
position of saying, "Look, you missed your opportunity
to challenge the fact that we used Method 2, and you
don't get to complain about it now. It's the law of
the case," essentially?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: I don't know that we could do that, because I think this is much more similar to the County's SEPA process, whereby, for example, the

County allows for an administrative appeal to the hearing examiner but not to County Council. And that type of interlocutory ultimate decision has to wait until the final overarching land use decision is issued.

That being said, I think petitioners do have a problem, because they simply have not actually appealed any issues related to the modification. I think the County can speak to its process better, but that is where I believe Your Honor -- or pardon me -- the petitioners' case fails under both arguments and why I've presented them as two different arguments.

Because under Scenario 1, if petitioners are right, and this -- this is a standalone land use decision, then their petition has to be dismissed because they have not actually raised a claim that this Court has jurisdiction over; they have only raised claims that pertain to the County's administration of the manual in itself. They have a venue to bring those claims. They can bring those to the hearing examiner, if they don't like the ultimate site plan decision, which is yet to be issued. But they haven't challenged anything about the modification itself.

The second question, then, which is, I believe,

the question that the County also addressed, is, does -- is this a final land use decision, in and of itself, under the definition of LUPA? And that's a separate question, of course.

THE COURT: And isn't this different from SEPA, because SEPA has its own statutory conditions that say, you only get one open-record appeal, and so -- MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Well, we --

THE COURT: -- we wait -- we wait to hear SEPA until we have a whole project because of the way the statute is written? Here, we don't have that. We simply have an administrative decision made by PDS that then can't be -- can't be sent to the hearing examiner. And so what is the appellant left to do?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Your Honor, I understand that.

There is still a consolidated, open record, and the problem, I think, petitioners continue to have is they haven't brought a claim that you can adjudicate under the modification.

I think the Court's raising a hypothetical that doesn't exist. The hypothetical being that, if petitioners had raised a claim that the modification was improperly granted because the stormwater modeling was incorrectly applied -- talking about the question of whether the modeling should allow for the

exceedances or not, et cetera -- there might be a claim that this Court could even adjudicate, but there's not.

Petitioners themselves have readily recognized they have only raised two issues: Whether the right method, 1 or 2, was applied under Minimum Requirement Number 8 -- that's strictly application of the stormwater manual -- and whether soil types were correctly identified. Again, that is strictly application of the stormwater manual.

If, for example, petitioners -- pardon me -- if for example, North -- NP 228 never needed a modification at all, petitioners would still be able to bring these very issues to a hearing examiner and the only issues that they raised in their land use petition. So they are losing nothing. But because they still have -- they still have the ability to raise these issues to the examiner, the problem is they have not raised anything that this Court can adjudicate.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Kraft-Klehm?

MS. KRAFT-KLEHM: Well, I certainly -- I don't know that I have all that much more to add to what Ms. Koloušková stated and then what was the

explanation in the briefing. And I don't dispute the unusualness of this particular modification, the section in our drainage code regarding modifications.

I think, from the County's perspective, and I stated it in the briefing, the errors that are raised by petitioner, the soil typing and the Method 1 versus Method 2, are not specific to the modification itself but -- but go toward the application of the County's drainage regulations to the project. And they can be raised in an appeal of the underlying permitting decision for the project.

And, in fact, the hearing examiner has jurisdiction over those -- over those specific errors, and it will be an open-record hearing on the project, if the site plan is appealed, where there will be an opportunity to flesh out these -- what are, I agree, fundamental issues that go to the project's compliance with the drainage regulations and ability to meet the drainage regulations. And those issues are not specific to compliance with Minimum Requirement 8.

So if, indeed, it was determined through an open-record hearing where evidence could be presented by all parties and this issue could be fleshed out, and the hearing examiner would have an opportunity to say, "You know what, this -- there are some

irregularities here, or the wrong soil type was used in the modeling," then the project would be sent back to PDS, you know, in a remand.

And the modification that PDS had earlier approved with respect to the method of complying with Minimum Requirement 8, that modification doesn't say, the project does not have to comply with Minimum Requirement 8, but it's the methodology that's used in — in determining that the wetland hydroperiod would be protected by the project. That — that modification would have no effect on that then, because it would be based on information that needed to be changed.

So for that purpose, although, you know, it is -it is an unusual process, the modification itself
isn't a final land use decision, because, here, we
have a -- you know, the final decision the County is
making on the site plan, that is going to incorporate
the full drainage review that the County does to
determine that the project complies with the drainage
regulations. And that hasn't been completed yet. If
there were changes that occurred between now and then,
they would impact the modification, and then if -- if
there were -- it's, you know, it's possible that the
County would have to go back and relook at that

modification, which is why we say that it's not really final, it's project-specific.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Any response, Ms. Conway?

MS. CONWAY: Yeah, just briefly, I wanted to bring us back to the decision that is — the modification decision that is at issue here. I think it's on the second page, it states, "The applicant is requesting a modification to allow the project to comply with Method 2 modeling criteria within the maximum extent feasible." And, again, on page 4, "The applicant has stated" — well, it goes on to say that, "The applicant has stated it does not have legal access to the wetland in question here," that my client owns, and, "The applicant's proposal to utilize Method 2 to demonstrate wetland hydroperiod protection under Minimum Requirement 8 is appropriate under these circumstances." The County has made that decision.

Now, whether this issue would have come up in a regular, you know, hearing examiner process if there had been no modification decision -- possibly. It's an interesting question, but it's not one we have to deal with, because that's not what happened here. In this case, the applicant requested a modification, the modification was granted, which locks in this whole

issue of Method 1 versus Method 2. It is a final decision with massive ramifications.

And that is why we filed the LUPA petition, because, you know, as -- and the Court mentioned this in a questioning of NP's counsel -- if there had been no appeal and we -- of the modification decision, and we got to the hearing examiner process, everyone on this call knows that NP would have been arguing, "It is too late to challenge the use of Method 2."

Nothing further.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Aramburu, anything final?

MR. ARAMBURU: I'd be gilding the lily,
Your Honor. I think I'll stop. Unless you have a
question for me, I have no further comments.

THE COURT: Well, I guess, for both land use appellants, the question I have is: Why not wait until the final project goes before the hearing examiner and just simply argue, "This just doesn't meet the drainage code. They applied the drainage code wrongly"?

MS. CONWAY: The hearing examiner is not going to be able to do anything about it.

THE COURT: Because he doesn't have the right to hear the appeal?

1 MS. CONWAY: Right.

THE COURT: But he does have the right to determine whether the entire project meets the drainage code and whether or not he can touch the modification. Can't he just then deny the approval and send it back?

MR. ARAMBURU: Your Honor, it's a final decision that's been made here. It binds -- it binds everyone involved with it. The decision which has been made here, to apply Method 2, to apply the soil types, is the predicate for the modification. And to go through this entire project -- I know Your Honor has previously been the Snohomish County Hearing Examiner. This is a project that is -- this is 541 units, 26 acres; it's a huge project.

It's going to have multiple questions of all variety of things. And if we come to the point in this process we find out that Method 1 should have been applied, that they used the wrong soil type, the whole project may have to be dramatically changed. And it does not make any sense, administratively, legally, or with respect to the rights of petitioners and property owners, to have that process.

The County made its own bed here. They said they -- they refused to make this a part of the

hearing examiner decision for reasons which will remain unexplained. But that's a decision that's before the Court now. That's the subject matter of this LUPA appeal.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Koloušková, you are the moving party, with respect to this issue. Would you like the last word?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Thank you, Your Honor. I think what Mr. Aramburu just explained was useful, because, again, this modification does not adjudicate the basic provisions of the drainage of the stormwater code.

It's only relevant if Method 2 is appropriate for the site we believe we can substantiate but which lies squarely within the hearing examiner's jurisdiction.

If there's no modification, then what would petitioners be appealing? They would be appealing these very issues under the site plan approval to the hearing examiner. The only purpose of the modification is the question of how the stormwater modeling, under Method 2, whether that specific modeling and those specific numbers can be exceeded, given the circumstances.

And to Ms. Conway's point about the decision itself, at the end of the decision, the list of conclusions are very clear on page 8, wherein the

County explains that where strict compliance with the Method 2 modeling criteria cannot be achieved, the County goes on to conclude the applicant's approach meets the intent to ensure the hydroperiod is maintained. A, that question was never raised to the Court, and, B, that question — the questions that petitioners did raise go to the hearing examiner.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. So if -- to go back to your point, you said the only purpose of the modification is the question of how the stormwater modeling under Method 2 can, with specific modeling and numbers, can be exceeded. Isn't the hearing examiner going to be locked into reviewing the project as the numbers are generated under Method 2, because he doesn't have the ability go back and look at Method 1? Won't he just be stuck with that analysis?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: No, I disagree with that,
Your Honor. And, again, I think the Court hit it on
the head. I think the examiner has to -- if there is
an appeal -- which I think we can all assume that
there will be an appeal of the site plan approval -THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: -- the examiner has to determine whether the manual was correctly applied. If he

disagrees -- which we believe we have quite well substantiated the use of Method 2 -- but if he disagrees and says Method 1 should be used, this modification has no value because it only pertains to how Method 2 is used.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: And so we have to have that answer first. And that's the issue that -- you know, again, I keep coming back to, is, we might have a slightly different argument, I suppose, if petitioners had actually raised a claim with respect to the modification itself; but, again, Your Honor, they have not. And we cannot -- we cannot pretend the issues exist or have been raised but haven't. The only two issues before the Court are the soils or the selection of methods, and it's it.

THE COURT: Well, you continue to say that they haven't raised an issue with the modification itself, but aren't they calling into question the -- the method that's being used --

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Yes.

THE COURT: -- or green-lighted through that modification?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: No. Your Honor, no. They have not. That issue, which method, 1 or 2, is a question

of the direct application of Minimum Requirement 8.

No modification is required under the plain language of the manual, which we have attached to our materials. The absolute, strict administration of MR 8, Minimum Requirement 8, requires the County to determine, should you use Method 1 or should you use Method 2. There's no modification decision related to that. That is MR 8 itself.

THE COURT: Okay. So it's only after they chose to allow them to use Method 2 that --

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: That's right.

THE COURT: -- there's a complaint? Okay. I think I get it.

Thank you, everyone. This is a strange case because of the way the County code is written and the way the administrative appeal process exists and doesn't exist in this case. It's a head-scratcher, but as, I think, Ms. Conway wrote in her brief, it is what it is.

While the code does say -- and the decision on -- on the modification itself says that this is a final decision, I find that it's not within the meaning of LUPA; that it is not a final land use decision within the context of the entire project; and, therefore, I think that it would be considered an interlocutory

appeal. And so I don't believe the Court has jurisdiction yet over this case.

So the Court is going to dismiss the appeal, with the caveat that I think the County and the NP are now on record as saying that this matter can be brought before the hearing examiner. And, obviously, if they took a different position and this matter were brought back before this judge, there would be additional head-scratching. So I find, based on the definition in the statute of what a final land use decision is, that we don't have that yet. So for that reason, the Court is going to grant the motion to dismiss.

And, Counsel, Ms. Koloušková, you provided me with a proposed order. Do you have a final one for me that you can send in Word that I could print?

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KOLOUŠKOVÁ: I need to modify that, because I included all three issues, and so I need to modify it to address the Court's oral decision today, and I'll take care of that.

Your Honor, may I do that on Monday, or would you like me to do that right away, now?

THE COURT: No, you can do that on Monday. That's fine. I'm sure you're all -- hopefully, you're all on

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4	COUNTY OF SNOHOMISH)
5	I, MEGAN R. FOOTE, Certified Court Reporter,
6	Washington CCR 3398, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the following is
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L5	counsel in this matter;
L6	I have no financial interest in the litigation.
L7	So certified in Everett, Washington.
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22	Hegan R. Foote
23	MEGAN R. FOOTE, CCR, CRR, RMR
24	
25	Dated: July 9th, 2024